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Abstract This paper contributes to the axiomatization of additive rules for ranking
sets of objects under the psychological principle of categorization. Firstly we proceed
with the case where the elements in the sets are categorized into at most three groups,
namely good (with value 1), neutral (with value 0), and bad (with value−1). Secondly,
we solve the case where there are only good and neutral elements. In both instances
the evaluation of the sets is purely additive. Lastly, we show that dropping one of the
axioms in our general characterization produces an axiomatization of the more gen-
eral class of evaluations where good and bad elements are weighted differently. Areas
of research in Economics such as committee selection problems, hedonic games and
matching are among the ranking sets models where our results could potentially be
applied.
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1 Introduction
Barberà, Bossert and Pattanaik devote the 17th chapter of the Handbook of Utility
Theory (2nd volume) to the problem of “Ranking Sets of objects” (cf. Barberà et al.
2004). Formally, the elementary question in ranking sets models is the following:
How should the possible subsets of X , a universe of elements, be ranked? Obviously
the answer depends very much on the particular context under inspection, that is,
on the interpretation of the elements of X , its subsets, and the binary relation that
ranks them. As a matter of fact, in the aforementioned chapter the authors provide a
thoughtful survey showing how ranking sets models apply in very diverse economic
settings, including social choice correspondences (see, for example, Gärdenfors 1976;
Kelly 1977; Pattanaik 1978), committee selection problems (Barberà et al. 1991), the
study of voters’ strategies under approval voting (Brams and Fishburn 1978), hedonic
games (Banerjee et al. 2001; Bogomolnaia and Jackson 2002), many-to-one matching
problems (Gale and Shapley 1962; Roth and Sotomayor 1990), problems of choice
under complete uncertainty (Barberà et al. 1984; Bossert et al. 2000; Arlegi 2007), the
approval of a number of issues or norms in a committee or legislative body (Barberà
et al. 1991), the ranking of opportunity sets (Jones and Sugden 1982, Pattanaik and Xu
1990; Sugden 1998), and the measurement of the qualitative (subjective) probability
of events (Kraft et al. 1959; Scott 1964).
In this paper we present several results, both at a theoretical level and as applied to
different contexts, that shed light on how sets should be ranked under the assumption
that the agent performs a kind of simple categorization of the elements of the initial
universe of elements X . Simplicity in categorization is captured by the fact that the
agent conceives of a reduced list of classes, namely no more than “good”, “neutral”
or “bad” elements. This might seem to involve a considerable loss of generality but
we show that there are a sizable number of settings where such an assumption is
compelling.
The are numeros reasons why an agent might perform such a rough categorization.
It is sometimes the case that the agent cannot further discriminate due to a bounded
perceptive capacity or to a lack of information. In other cases it is not necessary for
the agent to discriminate further given the particular problem in hand. A third reason,
related to both of the above, is that a more refined discrimination could produce better
results at the expense of a sacrifice. Categorization is then the natural response to the
need to simplify a complex decision-making problem and to economize on the cost of
processing all the information. This is in fact a well-recognized principle that prevails
in cognitive and social psychology, especially since Allport (1954).
For example, candidates for entry into a coalition or assembly might be desirable
or not depending merely on whether they belong to the agent’s party and are expected
to cast their vote in favor or against his/her interests; or new candidates for a job or for
membership of a club or committee might be evaluated solely according to whether
they fulfill certain qualification requirement or hold a certain entitlement (see Samet
and Schmeidler 2003; Dimitrov et al. 2007). Similarly, an individual who professes
a certain religion or has a particular political ideology might evaluate a set of norms
exclusively according to whether they are compatible with the principles of his/her
religion or ideology. When evaluating the freedom of choice that an opportunity set
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provides it is sometimes the case that there is a partition between opportunities that
increase the freedom of the agent and opportunities that do not (see Romero-Medina
2001). Finally, in a context of uncertainty there are situations where the feasible out-
comes are evaluated depending solely on their compatibility with the agent’s interests
(see Bogomolnaia et al. 2005; Bogomolnaia and Moulin 2004).1
Furthermore, the relevance of the kind of simple categorization that we propose
lies in the fact that it turns out to have theoretical implications, for example regarding
strategy-proofness in voting (Brams and Fishburn 1978, 2002), efficiency and strategy-
proofness in collective choice problems in an uncertainty context (Bogomolnaia et al.
2005), the specification of group formation models (Barberà et al. 2001), stability
in hedonic games (Dimitrov et al. 2006), and the economic evaluation of individual
freedom of choice (Pattanaik and Xu 1990; Romero-Medina 2001).
In line with the method adopted in the ranking sets literature, we follow an axi-
omatic approach to the problem. We start by analyzing the consequences of three
elementary axioms, and then investigate the formal implications of relaxing the initial
axiomatic structure of the problem.
A basic feature of the categorization phenomenon is that it simplifies the decision
problem by narrowing the range of comparative judgements of the decision maker
among the basic elements. Two of the three axioms that we propose capture the kind
of simplicity that we attribute to such a reduction process. On the one hand, Symmetry
within categories (SWC) expresses that categorization is simple in the sense that once
an item has been revealed as good, neutral or bad the agent does not discrimine further.
On the other hand, Symmetry across categories (SAC) establishes that when good and
bad elements exist, no category is stronger or weaker than the other. This is done by
imposing that the desirability of any element that has been revealed as good (bad) must
be offset by the undesirability of any element that has been labeled as bad (good). We
add a requirement of separability called Independence (IN). Conditions of this type
hark back to de Finetti (1931) and are widely used in ranking sets literature.
The conditions above permit to infer which are the good, neutral and bad elements
endogenously from the information given by the ranking over the sets.2 Thus, our first
result shows that the three axioms are fulfilled if and only if the agent ranks sets as if:
(1) the three categories of elements (good, neutral and bad) were attached to values of
−1, 0, and 1 respectively; and (2) the value of the subsets were calculated by the mere
addition of the valuations of their elements.We have called this theGood–Neutral–Bad
rule (“GNB rule”).
As for the analysis of the consequences of relaxing the axiomatic structure of the
problem, the most interesting result arises when the sometimes controversial axiom
SAC is dropped. In that case, the two remaining axioms (SWC and Independence)
characterize a meaningful family of rankings where the agent performs a weighted
1 In many of the examples mentioned categorization is made only in a dichotomic “good–bad” way. Our
characterization results include this as a particular case where no “neutral” category exists.
2 Other papers such as Jones and Sugden (1982), Pattanaik and Xu (1990) and Romero-Medina (2001)
also consider some kinds of categorization among significant and non-significant elements, but such a dis-
tinction is made, ex-ante, as a primitive of the model. Moreover, they only apply to the particular problem
of ranking opportunity sets.
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addition of the positive and negative values of the elements that have been revealed,
respectively, as good and bad. We call this the “weighted GNB rule”. Barberà et al.
(2001), for example, use such a rule in a group formation model.
As noted above, the results also apply to situations where categorization is made in
a dichotomous “good/bad” way, with no “neutral” category (as in the study of approval
voting procedures by Brams and Fishburn 2002). Likewise, particular specifications
include cases where there are no bad elements, such as the opportunity sets ranking
problem.
In addition to the fact that they arise from our axioms, we believe that both the
GNB and the weighted GNB rules are natural and interesting as such. In particular,
they are conspicuous cases of the family of separable preferences over sets, which
are commonly used in the analysis of voting situations (Barberà et al. 1991; Berga
et al. 2004; Ju 2003, 2005) and coalition formation games (Burani and Zwicker 2003;
Dimitrov et al. 2006). They are also prominent examples of additively representable
rankings over sets, a special subfamily of separable preferences that also arise in many
economic contexts (see, for instance, Alcantud and Arlegi 2008).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 contains some fundamen-
tals of the model. Section 3 sets out the three basic axioms that characterize the GNB
rule. All the characterization results are stated and proved in Sect. 4: the characteriza-
tion theorem and the corresponding proof for the GNB rule are presented in Sect. 4.1.
Section 4.2 explores some consequences of dropping or relaxing the SWC axiom. One
of them is that a rule proposed in Alcantud and Arlegi (2008) turns out to be a special
case of a GNB rule. Section 4.3 proves that by dropping SAC the aforementioned
weighted GNB rule becomes characterized. Section 5 contains some final comments.
2 Basic setup
Hereafter X represents the universal set of elements which, unless otherwise stated, is
assumed to be finite. χ0 denotes the set of subsets of X , including the empty set. We
denote by  a binary relation, defined on χ0, which is complete and transitive (i.e. a
complete preorder or “ordering”). The asymmetric factor and symmetric factor of 
are denoted, respectively by  and ∼. In general we interpret  as a weak preference
relation among sets, and  and ∼ as the corresponding strict preference and indif-
ference relations. ξ stands for the set of all orderings on χ0, and ¬ denotes logical
negation.
Definition 1 Associated with ∈ ξ , the characteristic function c of (X,) is defined
by the following expression: For each x ∈ X ,
c(x) =
⎧
⎪⎨
⎪⎩
−1 if ∅  {x}
0 if {x} ∼ ∅
1 if {x}  ∅
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Definition 2 The ranking of sets  is said to be a GNB ranking if
for all A, B ∈ χ0 : A  B if and only if
∑
a∈A
c(a) 
∑
b∈B
c(b) (1)
where c stands for its characteristic function and
∑
a∈∅ c(a) is defined as 0.
The interpretation of a GNB rule is plain: a ranking is GNB-type when it is additive
on the basis of its characteristic function.
The characteristic function, c, of (X,) is a particular case of what we call a GNB
function, namely, any function c : X −→ {−1, 0, 1}, which can be interpreted as if
the agent had classified the elements of X into three categories, interpreted as Good
(label 1), Neutral (label 0), and Bad (label −1). Therefore, Definition 2 includes the
case where there exists a GNB function c such that for all A, B ∈ χ0 : A  B
if and only if
∑
a∈A c(a) 
∑
b∈B c(b) with the convention
∑
a∈∅ c(a).3 This in
turn contains the instance where c : X −→ {0, 1}, which is the subject of specific
analysis in Alcantud and Arlegi (2008, Section 4). It is worth mentioning that the
latter setting incorporates two special subcases. On the one hand, if c(x) = 1 for all
x ∈ X , the cardinality rule that Pattanaik and Xu (1990) propose in the context of
ranking opportunity sets in terms of freedom of choice is obtained. On the other hand,
when c(x) = 0 for all x ∈ X the corresponding GNB rule is trivial: the universal
indifference rule (according to which A ∼ B for all A, B ∈ χ0) appears.
Since any binary relation that arises from (1) is necessarily a complete preorder, no
insight is lost by restricting the study to this class of relations.
The model for GNB rules (and its extension in Sect. 4.3 below) finds a formal inti-
mation to the proposal in Fishburn (1992). Nevertheless, differences in the approaches
are noticeable. Our final Sect. 5 explores this issue in more detail. At this point we
emphasize that our objective is to propose axiomatic characterizations of various rules,
and that such characterizations are made under the assumption of simple categoriza-
tion. This is not the case of Fishburn (1992) insightful analysis of general properties of
self-reflecting signed orders and conditions for their extension to subset preferences
in more general contexts.
3 Ranking sets under simple categorization: axioms
In this section we present and discuss three simple axioms that seek to capture the
key properties that we associate with the phenomenon of simple categorization. In
Sect. 4 below we prove that these three axioms characterize the family of order-
ings on χ0 that are additively representable on the basis of its characteristic function
(cf. Theorem 4.1). Subsequently, we explore the possibilities and consequences of
relaxing or dropping some of the axioms.
3 An important reason for taking the characteristic function c as a primitive of the model instead of c is
that it enables the partition among good, neutral and bad elements to be obtained endogenously from the
information given by the ranking .
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• Symmetry within categories (SWC). If ({a}  ∅ and {b}  ∅) or (∅  {a} and
∅  {b}) then {a} ∼ {b}.
• Symmetry across categories (SAC). If {a}  ∅  {b} then {a, b} ∼ ∅.
• Independence (IN). ∀A, B, C, D ∈ χ0 such that (A ∪ B) ∩ (C ∪ D) = ∅ and
C ∼ D, A  B if and only if A ∪ C  B ∪ D.
Axiom SWC requires that there be no different levels of desirability (undesirabil-
ity) concerning singletons. In terms of the idea of simple categorization that we want
to model, this axiom says that categorization is “simple” in the sense that once an
element has been recognized as “desirable” or “undesirable”, the agent is unable to
discriminate its degree of desirability/undesirability. This kind of simplicity in catego-
rization closely connects with the literature on categorization and stereotypes in social
psychology. Furthermore, as already announced in the Introduction, it is particularly
suitable under certain interpretations of the sets. For example, in decision problems
that involve evaluation of candidates for a group, individual preferences are very often
based uniquely on binary criteria such as membership or not of the same party, pos-
session or not of a a certain qualification, etc. As applied to desirable singletons, SWC
is very similar to the indifference between no choice situations (INCS) axiom pro-
posed by Pattanaik and Xu (1990) for the evaluation of intrinsic value of freedom
of choice that an opportunity set provides. According to INCS any two singletons
are indifferent because either provides the same degree of freedom (e.g. no freedom
at all).
Axiom SAC formally expresses another aspect of the kind of simplicity that we
propose for categorization. In words it states that if a singleton is preferred to the
empty set, and another singleton is worse than the empty set, then a two-element set
consisting of both elements should be indifferent to the empty set. To put it shortly:
The value of any desirable element is always offset by the value of any undesirable
element, and vice-versa. The type of ease of categorization that the axiom expresses
can be interpreted in different ways: For example it can be understood as if the axiom
establishes some kind of equidistance between the category of desirable elements
and the category of undesirable elements. It could also be interpreted as assuming
that neither category is stronger than the other and that they are symmetric with
respect to the reference point of the empty set. Though there are different settings
where the axiom makes sense (for example, when a voting process is involved),
we are aware that the axiom may be unsuitable in other contexts. This leads us to
develop a thorough analysis of the formal implications of relaxing SAC in Sect. 4.3
below.
Axiom IN does not reflect any particular notion of simplicity in categorization, but
it does play an important role as a kind of separability condition between the ele-
ments of the sets, thus preventing any kind of cross-effects between them. Formally,
it requires that adding to (or removing from) two sets A and B respective indifferent
sets C and D should not affect the primitive relation between A and B. Axiom IN is
very close to one of the three axioms that de Finetti (1931) proposes as necessary in
the qualitative probability measuring problem. However, similar conditions are very
common in ranking sets models under different scenarios.
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It is easy to see that IN implies the following properties:
∀a, b ∈ X, ({a}  ∅ and {b}  ∅) implies {a, b}  ∅.
∀a, b ∈ X, (∅  {a} and ∅  {b}) implies ∅  {a, b}.
∀a, b ∈ X, ({a} ∼ ∅ and {b} ∼ ∅) implies {a, b} ∼ ∅.
We check that axioms SWC, SAC, and IN are independent in Sect. 4.1 below. Nev-
ertheless there is a logical relationship between them, which we reveal in Sect. 4.2
below: Under a fairly weak requirement of the domain of the problem (that there exist
at least one element in X labeled as good and one other labeled as bad), SAC and IN
imply SWC.
4 Characterization results
4.1 The GNB rule
We are now in a position to characterize GNB rules (cf. Definition 2) as follows.4
Theorem 4.1 Let ∈ ξ . Then  satisfies IN, SAC and SWC if and only if  is a GNB
ranking.
In order to prove the theorem we make use of the following lemma, which states
some implications of IN and SAC.
Lemma 4.2 Let ∈ ξ . If  satisfies IN and SAC then the following two properties
hold true.
(a) For all A ∈ χ0 : A  ∅ if and only if ∑a∈A c(a)  0.
(b) For all A ∈ χ0 : ∅  A if and only if ∑a∈A c(a)  0.
Proof It suffices to prove (a). We use a recursive argument on the cardinality of A.
The definition of a characteristic function means that (a) holds for sets with cardinality
1. Assume that (a) is true for sets with cardinality less than n, and that A ∈ χ0 has n
elements. We need to check that either both A  ∅ and
∑
a∈A c(a)  0 are true, or
both are false. Two cases arise.
Case 1: For all a ∈ A, {a}  ∅. A recursive argument based on IN and transitivity of
 yields A  ∅. Thus both A  ∅ and
∑
a∈A c(a)  0 are true, and the equivalence
(a) is valid.
Case 2: Case 1 does not hold. This means that there is a ∈ A such that ∅  {a}.
If there is no a′ ∈ A such that {a′}  ∅ then a recursive argument based on IN
and transitivity analogous to that used in Case 1 yields ∅  A. Since ∑a∈A c(a) < 0
both A  ∅ and
∑
a∈A c(a)  0 are false, and the equivalence (a) is true.
4 The results throughout this subsection are valid if X is either finite or infinite, and χ0 is the set of finite
subsets of X , including the empty set.
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Assume now that there is a′ ∈ A such that {a′}  ∅. Since {a, a′} ∼ ∅ due to
SAC, axiom IN yields
A = (A − {a, a′}) ∪ {a, a′} ∼ A − {a, a′}.
Moreover, a simple computation shows that
∑
b∈A
c(b) =
⎛
⎝
∑
b∈A−{a,a′}
c(b)
⎞
⎠ + c(a) + c(a′) =
∑
b∈A−{a,a′}
c(b).
Summing up: the equivalence (A  ∅ ⇔ ∑a∈A c(a)  0) is true if and only if the
equivalence (A − {a, a′}  ∅ ⇔ ∑a∈A−{a,a′} c(a)  0) is true. By the inductive
hypothesis, the proof is complete. unionsq
Proof of Theorem 4.1 Necessity is immediately apparent. Sufficiency remains to be
proved, that is, if  satisfies IN, SAC and SWC then the equivalence (1) holds true.
Let A, B ∈ χ0. It must be checked that ∑a∈A c(a) 
∑
b∈B c(b) holds true.
It can be assumed that ∀A′, B ′ ∈ χ0,
∀a ∈ A′,∀b ∈ B ′, ¬[{a} ∼ {b}] (2)
The reason is as follows. Due to IN, whenever a ∈ A′, b ∈ B ′ and {a} ∼ {b} it can be
checked that the equivalence (A′  B ′ ⇔ ∑a∈A′ c(a) 
∑
b∈B′ c(b)) is true if and
only if the equivalence (A′ − {a}  B ′ − {b} ⇔ ∑a∈A′−{a} c(a) 
∑
b∈B′−{b} c(b))
is true. It is then possible to proceed recursively until (2) is met by a suitable pair of
subsets of A′ and B ′.
Now three cases arise.
Case 1: There is a ∈ A such that {a}  ∅.
If {b} ∼ ∅ for all b ∈ B (which includes the case B = ∅) then the proof is complete
by (a) in Lemma 4.2.
Assume therefore that there is b ∈ B such that ¬[{b} ∼ ∅]. Because (2) and
SWC together exclude {b}  ∅, the consequence ∅  {b} follows. Again by (2)
and SWC, {a′}  ∅ must hold for each a′ ∈ A. Now both A  ∅  B and∑
a∈A c(a)  0 
∑
b∈B c(b) follow. Therefore the equivalence (1) holds true.
Case 2: There is a ∈ A such that ∅  {a}.
This case is similar to Case 1, but now the equivalence (1) holds true because both
A  B and
∑
a∈A c(a) 
∑
b∈B c(b) are false.
Case 3: If Case 1 and Case 2 are not met, then a ∈ A ⇒ {a} ∼ ∅ (this includes the
case A = ∅).
Now statement (1) boils down to A ∼ ∅  B if and only if 0  ∑b∈B c(b). This
holds by (b) in Lemma 4.2. unionsq
The following examples show that the characterization is tight, that is, that the three
axioms in Theorem 4.1 are logically independent.
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1. Let X = {x, y1, y2} and consider the following rule: ∀A, B ∈ χ0, A  B ⇔∑
a∈A u(a) 
∑
b∈B u(b), with u(x) = 3, u(y1) = u(y2) = 1. The rule satis-
fies IN, and SAC holds vacuously. However, SWC does not hold true since {x} 
{y1}  ∅.
2. Let X = {x1,x2, y1, y2}, and consider a rule as before according to the following
values of u : u(x1) = u(x2) = 2, u(y1) = u(y2) = −1. Again, the rule satisfies
IN and SWC. However, it is plain that SAC is not satisfied.
3. Let X = {x, y, z} and  defined on χ0 be such that {x, y, z}  {x, y} ∼ {x} ∼
{y}  ∅ ∼ {x, z} ∼ {y, z}  {z}. Then  satisfies SWC and SAC, but not IN
since for example, {x}  {x, z} but not {x, y}  {x, y, z}.
In the subsections below we are concerned with particular specifications of the
axiomatic structure identified by Theorem 4.1 and the consequences of dropping or
relaxing one of the three axioms. To that end we point out that dropping IN leads to
rather uninteresting rules: It is easy to check that by only imposing SWC and SAC
comparisons between two sets A, B can be established only if each of them is either
the empty set, a singleton or contains exactly one “good” and one “bad” element.
We therefore skip that analysis. In Sect. 4.2 we explore what happens when SWC is
dropped or relaxed, and in Sect. 4.3 we perform a parallel analysis when the axiom
dropped is SAC.
4.2 The restricted-cardinality based rule
In order to explore the rules that satisfy axioms IN and SAC, we first emphasize the
fact that axiom SWC in Theorem 4.1 is superfluous if we assume that the domain
is minimally rich, namely, if there exist at least one good and one bad element. We
state this formally by means of the following Lemma. Moreover, this result allows to
propose an alternative to Theorem 4.1 in the form of a Corollary.
Lemma 4.3 Let ∈ ξ and assume that there exist x, y ∈ X such that {x}  ∅  {y}.
If  satisfies IN and SAC then it satisfies SWC.
Proof If ({a}  ∅ and {b}  ∅) then SAC entails {y, a} ∼ ∅ and {y, b} ∼ ∅, and
now transitivity and IN yield {a} ∼ {b}. Likewise, if (∅  {a} and ∅  {b}) then
{x, a} ∼ ∅ and {x, b} ∼ ∅, thus {a} ∼ {b}.5 unionsq
Corollary 4.4 Let ∈ ξ and assume that there exist x, y ∈ X with {x}  ∅  {y}.
Then  satisfies IN and SAC if and only if  is a GNB ranking.
To summarize the formal consequences of dropping SWC, that is, the exact impli-
cations of SAC and IN, two cases can be distinguished: (i) There exist x, y ∈ X such
that {x}  ∅  {y}, in which case SWC turns out to be a derived axiom andGNB rules
can thus be characterized solely by SAC and IN. And (ii) either {x}  ∅∀x ∈ X or
∅  {x}∀x ∈ X , in which case SAC is a vacuous axiom, and then dropping SWC just
leads to the family of binary relations over sets that satisfy the independence axiom.
5 It should be noted that a weaker version of IN, where both C and D are singletons, also allows the Lemma
to be proved.
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Let us now explore the following class of rules. The ranking  over the subsets
of X is a restricted-cardinality based rule (henceforth RCB) if a subset Xs ⊆ X
exists such that A  B if and only if |A ∩ Xs |  |B ∩ Xs |. Alcantud and Arlegi
(2008) discuss this ranking widely and provide several economic contexts where it
is suitable (especially for the problem of ranking opportunity sets). It can be easily
checked that RCB rules are a particular case of GNB rules with no “bad” elements in
the domain. Formally, assume that there is no x ∈ X such that ∅  {x}, and let us
define Xs by Xs = {x ∈ X such that {x}  ∅}. It turns out that if  is a RCB rule,
then A  B ⇔ |A ∩ Xs |  |B ∩ Xs | ⇔ ∑a∈A c(a) 
∑
b∈B c(b). In other words,
an RCB rule is a particular case of a GNB rule where the range of its characteristic
function c is restricted to {0, 1}.
Alcantud and Arlegi (2008) characterize that class of rules axiomatically through
the following axioms:
• Non-negativity. For all A ∈ χ0, A  ∅.
• Symmetry between significant elements: {x}  ∅ and {y}  ∅ imply {x} ∼ {y},
for each x, y ∈ X .
• Simple independence: For every A, B ∈ χ0 and x ∈ A ∪ B, A  B if and only if
A ∪ {x}  B ∪ {x}.
Theorem 4.5 (Alcantud and Arlegi 2008) Let  be a complete and transitive binary
relation defined on χ0. Then:
 is RCB if and only if it satisfies non negativity, simple independence and symmetry
between significant elements.
At this point a comparison with the axioms that characterize GNB rules is in order.
On the one hand, it is clear that symmetry between significant elements and simple
independence are weaker versions of SWC and IN respectively. As for non-negativity,
this axiom just makes explicit the restriction referred to above that no bad sets (and
therefore singletons) are conceivable. As already pointed out, there are various deci-
sional contexts where such an assumption is suitable. As a matter of fact, like IN,
Non-negativity is also proposed by de Finetti (1931) as a necessary condition for
ranking events in terms of their qualitative probability. In this case, the axiom just
expresses that no event can be perceived as less probable than the empty event.
The fact that an RCB rule is a particularization of a GNB rule means that it must
be possible to subsume the axioms that characterize the RCB rule as particulariza-
tions of those that characterize the GNB rule under the assumption that there is no
x ∈ X such that ∅  {x}. Indeed, under such an assumption, it is easy to see that
SWC becomes “symmetry between significant elements”, SAC holds vacuously, and
“simple independence” is a weaker version of IN.
4.3 The weighted GNB rule
Under the assumption that there exist x, y ∈ X with {x}  ∅  {y}, the precise
implications of SAC plus IN are established in Corollary 4.4: they hold exactly in
the presence of GNB behavior. In this Section we analyze the precise implications of
SWC together with IN. We check that they hold exactly in the presence of a weighted
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GNB behavior, i.e. behavior that attaches possibly different weights to good and bad
elements. To that end we introduce further notation and prove Theorem 4.6 below.
For all A ⊆ X, g(A) = {a ∈ A : {a}  ∅}, and b(A) = {a ∈ A : ∅  {a}}.
The sets g(A) and b(A) are interpreted as the subsets of good and bad elements of A
respectively. Observe that
∑
a∈A c(a) = |g(A)| − |b(A)| for all A ∈ χ0.
When A, B ∈ χ0 are such that |g(A)| = |g(B)|, σAB denotes the value |b(A)|−|b(B)||g(A)|−|g(B)| .
Of course, σAB = σB A throughout.
Finally, we let S(A) = {B ∈ χ0 : |g(A)| > |g(B)| and |b(A)| > |b(B)|}.
Definition 3 We call the ranking of sets  WGNB (or weighted GNB) if there exist
α, β ∈ R++ such that A  B ⇔ α|g(A)| − β|b(A)|  α|g(B)| − β|b(B)| for all
A, B ∈ χ0.
Clearly, GNB rules areWGNB rules where α = β. Our next Theorem characterizes
the more general family of WGNB rules axiomatically:
Theorem 4.6 Let  be an ordering on χ0. Then  satisfies IN and SWC if and only
if  is WGNB.
The fact that WGNB rules agree with IN and SWC can be easily checked. We pro-
ceed to prove the converse implication, for which several lemmata are proved under
the common assumptions IN and SWC.
Lemma 4.7 For all A ∈ χ0, A ∼ A \ {x ∈ A : {x} ∼ ∅}.
Proof Denote {x ∈ A : {x} ∼ ∅} by {x1, . . . ,xn}. By IN xn ∼ ∅ implies
{x1, . . . ,xn} ∼ {x1, . . . ,xn−1}. Repeating the argument n-times, and by transi-
tivity, {x1, . . . ,xn} ∼ ∅ is obtained. Now IN permits the conclusion that A ∼
A \ {x1, . . . ,xn}. unionsq
For the sake of proving Theorem 4.6 below, Lemma 4.7 allows {x ∈ A : {x} ∼
∅} = ∅ to be assumed for all A ∈ χ0 henceforth in this Section.
Lemma 4.8 For all A, B ∈ χ0, |g(A)| = |g(B)| and |b(A)| = |b(B)| implies A ∼ B.
Proof Let A = {g1(A), . . . , gm(A), b1(A), . . . , bn(A)}, B = {g1(B), . . . , gm(B),
b1(B), . . . , bn(B)}, where g(A) = {g1(A), . . . , gm(A)} and b(A) = {b1(A), . . . ,
bn(A)}, g(B) = {g1(B), . . . , gm(B)} and b(B) = {b1(B), . . . , bn(B)}. By SWC
bi (A) ∼ bi (B) for all i  n, and IN can be applied n times to obtain thatb(A) ∼ b(B).
Also by SWC gi (A) ∼ gi (B) for all i  m. Observe that (g(A) ∪ g(B)) ∩ (b(A) ∪
b(B)) = ∅. Thus, IN can be applied m times analogously to obtain g(A) ∪ b(A) ∼
g(B) ∪ b(B), that is, A ∼ B. unionsq
Lemma 4.9 For all A, B ∈ χ0, if |g(A)| = |g(B)| and |b(A)| > |b(B)| then B  A.
Proof Start by assuming that |b(A)| = |b(B)| + 1. Let A = {g1(A), . . . , gm(A),
b1(A), . . . , bn+1(A)}. With no loss of generality bn+1(A) /∈ b(B). Lemma 4.8 yields
B ∼ A \ {bn+1(A)}, and a direct argument based on IN proves B  A.
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In the general case, a recursive argument based on the instance above yields the
thesis. unionsq
Lemma 4.10 For all A, B ∈ χ0, if |g(A)| > |g(B)| and |b(A)| = |b(B)| then A  B.
Proof Analogous to Lemma 4.9. unionsq
From Lemmata 4.8–4.10, for all A, B ∈ χ0 the following holds:
if |g(A)|  |g(B)| and |b(A)|  |b(B)| then every α, β ∈ R++ verify
A  B ⇔ α|g(A)| − β|b(A)|  α|g(B)| − β|b(B)| (3)
Lemma 4.11 For all A, B, C, D ∈χ0 such that B ∈ S(A), D ∈ S(C), and |b(A)|−|b(B)||g(A)|−|g(B)| =
|b(C)|−|b(D)|
|g(C)|−|g(D)| : A  B ⇔ C  D.
Proof For any pair of sets V, W ∈ χ0 such that W ∈ S(V ), if p, q ∈ N are such
that pq is an irreducible fraction and
p
q = σV W then there exists n ∈ {1, 2, 3, . . .} with|b(V )| − |b(W )| = pn and |g(V )| − |g(W )| = qn.
It is clearly possible to construct E ∈ χ0 with the properties |b(E)| = p, |b(E)| =
q, E∩W = ∅, E ⊆ V . ByLemma4.8, anyother E ′ with |b(E ′)| = p and |b(E ′)| = q
satisfies E ∼ E ′.
The argument above assures that our Lemma reduces to the following property:
E  ∅ implies V  W ;∅  E implies W  V ; and ∅ ∼ E implies W ∼ V . We
prove this equivalent property by a recursive construction.
Let W1 = W ∪ E . When n = 1, this set coincides with V thus the thesis follows
directly from IN. In all cases, an appeal to this axiom yields that E  ∅ if and only
if W1  W , and also ∅  E if and only if W  W1.
E1 ∈ χ0 can also be constructed with the properties |b(E1)| = p, |b(E1)| = q,
E1 ∩ W1 = ∅, and E1 ⊆ V .
Let W2 = W1 ∪ E . Reasoning as above we conclude as follows:
W2  W1 ⇔ E1  ∅ ⇔ E  ∅ ⇔ W1  W , thus E  ∅ ⇒ W2  W.
W1  W2 ⇔ ∅  E1 ⇔ ∅  E ⇔ W  W1, thus ∅  E ⇒ W  W2.
W2 ∼ W1 ⇔ E1 ∼ ∅ ⇔ E ∼ ∅ ⇔ W1 ∼ W , thus E ∼ ∅ ⇒ W2 ∼ W.
In case n = 2 the argument ends because W2 = V .
By repeating this construction we reach Wn = V , which satisfies the property
E  ∅ ⇒ Wn  W, ∅  E ⇒ W  Wn , and E ∼ ∅ ⇒ Wn ∼ W as was claimed.
unionsq
Proof of Theorem 4.6 We first argue that the property that we must check can be sim-
plified. As argued in (3), we can narrow our interest to the pairs of sets A, B ∈ χ0
such that either A ∈ S(B) or B ∈ S(A) since no restriction is imposed by the cases
where |g(A)|  |g(B)| and |b(A)|  |b(B)|.
Observe further that if A  B for all A, B ∈ χ0 such that B ∈ S(A), then the
theorem is proved by taking positive α, β such that α
β
> |X |. Analogously, if B  A
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for all A, B ∈ χ0 such that B ∈ S(A) then the theorem is proved by taking positive
α, β such that α
β
< 1|X | .
6
In view of these facts, there is no loss of generality if it is assumed that there exist
A, B, C, D ∈ χ0 such that B ∈ S(A), D ∈ S(C), A  B and D  C .
Now, in order to proceed with the proof of the Theorem two cases appear:
Case 1: There do not exist A, B ∈ χ0 such that |b(A)| = |b(B)|, |g(A)| = |g(B)|
and A ∼ B.
Define the following values:
σ1 = max
{ |b(A)| − |b(B)|
|g(A)| − |g(B)| : A  B, B ∈ S(A)
}
= max{σAB : A B, B ∈ S(A)}
and
σ2 = min
{ |b(A)| − |b(B)|
|g(A)| − |g(B)| : B  A, B ∈ S(A)
}
= min{σAB : B  A, B ∈ S(A)}.
We prove that σ1 < σ2. Observe that σ1 = σ2 is against Lemma 4.11, therefore it
suffices to prove that σ1 > σ2 leads to a contradiction.
We take sets A, B with B ∈ S(A), A  B at which the maximum σ1 is attained,
that is, A, B verify |b(A)|−|b(B)||g(A)|−|g(B)| 
|b(F)|−|b(G)|
|g(F)|−|g(G)| for all F, G ∈ χ0 such that F  G
and G ∈ S(F). Analogously, we also take sets C, D with D ∈ S(C), D  C , at which
the maximum σ2 is attained.
We write σ1 = pq , σ2 = rt , both irreducible fractions, and p, q, r, t > 0. It should
be noted that A′ and B can be always chosen so that |b(A′)| − |b(B)| = p and
|g(A′)|−|g(B)| = q, and similarlyC ′ and D canbe chosen so that |b(C ′)|−|b(D)| = r
and |g(C ′)|−|g(D)| = t . The first claim is justified by removing the appropriate num-
ber of elements from A in order to obtain a set A′ that satisfies σA′ B = σAB and B ∈
S(A′), and the second claim is justified similarly. Then, in accordance to Lemma 4.11
A  B if and only if A′  B andC  D if and only ifC ′  D. Therefore, it is assumed
throughout that |b(A)| − |b(B)| = p, |g(A)| − |g(B)| = q, |b(C)| − |b(D)| = r and
|g(C)| − |g(D)| = t .
We distinguish the following exhaustive list of subcases:
Case 1.1: p  r and q  t with at least one strict inequality.
In case p = r we let B ′ = B, otherwise there is BA ⊆ b(A) with |BA| = p − r
and BA ∩b(B) = ∅ and we let B ′ = B ∪ BA. In this latter instance Lemma 4.9 yields
B  B ′. In all cases, given that A  B, A  B ′ results.
In case q = t we let D′ = D, otherwise there is GC ⊆ g(C) with |GC | = t − q
and GC ∩ g(D) = ∅ and we let D′ = D ∪ GC . In this latter instance Lemma 4.10
yields D′  D. In all cases, given that D  C, D′  C results.
6 Note that in these cases we have two lexicographic rules. The first compares any pair of sets by max-
imizing the number of good elements, and minimizes the number of bad elements only in case of a tie.
The second one is the dual lexicographic rule. In other words, such lexicographic rules are particular cases
of WGNB rules for the indicated values of α and β.
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By construction |b(A)|−|b(B
′)|
|g(A)|−|g(B′)| = |b(C)|−|b(D
′)|
|g(C)|−|g(D′)| = rq . Because B ′ ∈ S(A) and D′ ∈
S(C), Lemma 4.11 assures A  B ′ ⇔ C  D′, which leads to a contradiction.
Case 1.2: p > r and q > t .
In this case some simple computations prove that p−rq−t >
p
q . Now there is BA ⊆
b(A) with |BA| = p − r and BA ∩ b(B) = ∅, and also there is G A ⊆ g(A) with
|G A| = q − t and G A ∩ g(B) = ∅. Let B ′ = B ∪ BA ∪ G A.
By construction |b(B
′)|−|b(B)|
|g(B′)|−|g(B)| = p−rq−t > pq . By the definition of σ1 as a maximum,
because there are no indifferences among sets with different number of both good and
bad elements and B ∈ S(B ′), necessarily B  B ′.
Again, by construction |b(A)|−|b(B
′)|
|g(A)|−|g(B′)| = rt = |b(C)|−|b(D)||g(C)|−|g(D)| . By Lemma 4.11 we
deduce B ′  A, and because A  B, transitivity yields the contradiction B ′  B.
Case 1.3: p < r and q < t .
In this case r−pt−q <
r
t . Now there is BC ⊆ b(C) with |BC | = p and BC ∩b(D) = ∅,
and also there is GC ⊆ g(C) with |GC | = q and GC ∩ g(D) = ∅. Let C ′ =
D ∪ BC ∪ GC .
By construction |b(C)|−|b(C
′)|
|g(C)|−|g(C ′)| = r−pt−q and C ′ ∈ S(C). Since r−pt−q < rt and there are
no indifferences between sets with different numbers of both good and bad elements,
and by the definition of σ2 as a minimum, we have that necessarily C  C ′, and by
transitivity D  C ′.
Also, by definition |b(C
′)|−|b(D)|
|g(C ′)|−|g(D)| = pq = |b(A)|−|b(B)||g(A)|−|g(B)| . By Lemma 4.11 that implies
C ′  D, leading to a contradiction.
Since all three of the possible cases above lead to a contradiction we conclude that
σ1 < σ2. This implies that there do not exist E, F ∈ χ0 with F ∈ S(E) such that
σ1 <
|b(E)|−|b(F)|
|g(E)|−|g(F)| < σ2 and E  F or F  E . Since there is no indifference between
pairs of sets with different numbers of both good and bad elements, for all E, F ∈ χ0
with F ∈ S(E) either |b(E)|−|b(F)||g(E)|−|g(F)|  σ1 or |b(E)|−|b(F)||g(E)|−|g(F)|  σ2 holds true.
Take any pair of numbers α, β ∈ R++ such that σ1 < αβ < σ2. For each E, F with
F ∈ S(E), |b(E)|−|b(F)||g(E)|−|g(F)| < αβ entails E  F , and |b(E)|−|b(F)||g(E)|−|g(F)| > αβ entails F  E ,
which completes the proof under Case 1.
Case 2: There exist A0, B0 ∈ χ0, such that B0 ∈ S(A0), |b(A0)| = |b(B0)|, |g(A0)| =
|g(B0)| and A0 ∼ B0.
Take α = |b(A0)| − |b(B0)| > 0 and β = |g(A0)| − |g(B0)| > 0. Due to Lemma
4.11, when C, D ∈ χ0 are such that D ∈ S(C) and |b(C)|−|b(D)||g(C)|−|g(D)| = αβ then C ∼ D
holds. Thus what remains to prove is the following:
1. ∀C, D ∈ χ0 such that D ∈ S(C) and |b(C)|−|b(D)||g(C)|−|g(D)| > αβ , D  C holds.
2. ∀C, D ∈ χ0 such that D ∈ S(C) and |b(C)|−|b(D)||g(C)|−|g(D)| < αβ , C  D holds.
Define the following values:
σ1 = max
{ |b(A)| − |b(B)|
|g(A)| − |g(B)| : A  B, B ∈ S(A)
}
= max{σAB : A  B, B ∈ S(A)}
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and
σ2 = min
{ |b(A)| − |b(B)|
|g(A)| − |g(B)| : B  A, B ∈ S(A)
}
= min{σAB : B  A, B ∈ S(A)}.
We proceed to prove that σ1 = σ2 = αβ according to the following steps. Since
B0 ∼ A0, σ1 < σ2 is false: σA0B0 = αβ  σ1 because A0  B0, and σA0B0  σ2
because B0  A0. We proceed to establish that σ1 > σ2 leads to a contradiction
through arguments which follow the line of the proof of Case 1. Consequently, α
β

σ1 = σ2  αβ and thus σ1 = σ2 = αβ as claimed.
Let σ1 = pq and σ2 = rt , both fractions being irreducible, and p, q, r, t > 0.
We take sets A, B with B ∈ S(A), A  B for which σ1 is attained. We also
take sets C, D with D ∈ S(C), D  C , for which σ2 is attained. In accordance to
Lemma 4.11, there is no loss of generality if we assume |b(A)| − |b(B)| = p and
|g(A)| − |g(B)| = q, and also |b(C)| − |b(D)| = r and |g(C)| − |g(D)| = t .
Again we split our argument into the following subcases:
Case 2.1: p  r and q  t with at least one strict inequality.
In case p = r we let B ′ = B, otherwise there is BA ⊆ b(A) with |BA| = p − r
and BA ∩b(B) = ∅ and we let B ′ = B ∪ BA. In this latter instance Lemma 4.9 yields
B  B ′. In conclusion, A  B ′ if p > r and A  B ′ if p = r .
In case q = t we let D′ = D, otherwise there is GC ⊆ g(C) with |GC | = t − q
and GC ∩ g(D) = ∅ and we let D′ = D ∪ GC . In this latter instance Lemma 4.10
yields D′  D. In conclusion, D′  C if q < t and D′  C if q = t .
By construction |b(A)|−|b(B
′)|
|g(A)|−|g(B′)| = |b(C)|−|b(D
′)|
|g(C)|−|g(D′)| = rq . Therefore, either p > r (thus
A  B ′ and Lemma 4.11 yields the contradiction C  D′) or q < t (thus D′  C
and Lemma 4.11 yields the contradiction B ′  A).
Case 2.2: p > r and q > t . As in Case 1.2, p−rq−t >
p
q .
Now there is BA ⊆ b(A) with |BA| = p − r and BA ∩ b(B) = ∅, and also there
is G A ⊆ g(A) with |G A| = q − t and G A ∩ g(B) = ∅. Let B ′ = B ∪ BA ∪ G A.
By construction |b(B
′)|−|b(B)|
|g(B′)|−|g(B)| = p−rq−t > pq . The definition of σ1 implies that one
must have B  B ′.
Because |b(A)|−|b(B
′)|
|g(A)|−|g(B′)| = pq = |b(C)|−|b(D)||g(C)|−|g(D)| , Lemma 4.11 implies B ′  A, thus, by
transitivity, B  A, contradicting A  B.
Case 2.3: p < r and q < t .
In this case r−pt−q <
r
t . Now there is BC ⊆ b(C)with |BC | = p and BC ∩b(D) = ∅,
and there is also GC ⊆ g(C) with |GC | = q and GC ∩ g(D) = ∅. Let C ′ =
D ∪ BC ∪ GC .
By construction |b(C)|−|b(C
′)|
|g(C)|−|g(C ′)| = r−pt−q andC ′ ∈ S(C). Since r−pt−q < rt , the definition
of σ2 yields C  C ′. Now transitivity implies D  C ′.
Because |b(C
′)|−|b(D)|
|g(C ′)|−|g(D)| = pq = |b(A)|−|b(B)||g(A)|−|g(B)| , Lemma 4.11 implies the contradiction
C ′  D.
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Since σ1 = σ2, if C, D are such that |b(C)|−|b(D)||g(C)|−|g(D)| > αβ the definition of σ1 conveys
D  C , and if they are such that |b(C)|−|b(D)||g(C)|−|g(D)| < αβ then C  D. This completes the
proof of the theorem. unionsq
5 Final comments and links to existing literature
Wehave explored the consequences of imposing different combinations of threemean-
ingful axioms on a ranking of sets of objects, namely independence (IN), symmetry
whithin categories (SWC), and symmetry across categories (SAC). We have checked
that these axioms are independent, and that the only rule that satisfies them is a GNB
rule. In fact, AxiomSWC is redundant when the rule satisfies an easily checkable char-
acteristic: the existence of elements that are ranked above and below the empty set.
Dropping SAC produces a natural generalization of the additive GNB rules where the
elements that are not “neutral” are weighted by two positive amounts, one associated
with being “good” and the other with being “bad”.
Alcantud and Arlegi (2008) also seek to explore the formal consequences of the
categorization phenomenon for the matter of ranking sets. Roughly speaking, in that
article the case under inspection is that of an agent that makes a categorization in a
countable number of positive and increasingly better classes, and then evaluates sets
additively according to the corresponding values of their elements. Special attention
is paid to the RCB rules, i.e. those that only distinguish between desirable and non-
desirable objects without further grading. Here we characterize the family of rules that
classify the elements into three classes/categories (desirable, neutral, and rejectable)
and may allocate a different weight to each category. The particular case where the
weights coincide is characterized by the corresponding axioms. We emphasize that
the proofs provided for this case (i.e. Sect. 4.1) are valid if X is infinite, and χ0 is the
set of finite subsets of X including the empty set. The same is true for Sect. 4.2.
Our model bears some comparison with Fishburn (1992) model of ranking sets
on the basis of signed orders.7 Fishburn (1992) proposes the notion of self-reflecting
signed orders as an aid in estimating preferences between subsets of items on the
basis of limited information. The inputs of a signed order are binary comparisons that
blend the desirability of excluding items from a subset and including items in it. In
particular, if X∗ is a disjoint copy of X , a self-reflecting signed order 1 on (X ∪ X∗)
is a weak order that compares relative likes and dislikes for items in X . For example,
1 allows comparisons such as the following to be made, “including x in a subset is
preferred to excluding y from it” (x 1 y∗), “excluding z from a subset is preferred
to including w in it” (z∗ 1 w), or “including a in a subset is preferred to including
b in it” (a 1 b).
Some natural properties of 1 enable helpful pieces of information to be induced
for the purpose of ranking subsets. For example, a partition of the elements of X
between positive, indifferent, and negative elements can be obtained according to
x 1 x∗,x ∼1 x∗, and x∗ 1 x respectively. The model also introduces the idea of
7 We thank an anonymous referee for pointing out this reference to us.
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a function f that preserves 1, which takes positive (negative/ null) values for good
(bad/neutral) items, such that for each x, y ∈ X, f (x)  f (y) ⇔ x 1 y, f (x) 
− f (y) ⇔ x 1 y∗ and − f (x)  f (y) ⇔ x∗ 1 y. At this point Fishburn (1992)
concentrates on additive rankings where A  B ⇔ f (A)  f (B), under the conven-
tion f (S) = ∑s∈S f (S) for each subset S.
With those elements at hand, the first main result in Fishburn (1992, Theorem 1)
enables some subsets to be identified as good, bad, and indifferent with a clear sense of
A  ∅, ∅  A, A ∼ ∅ on the basis of certain “offsetting” conditions. For example,
a set is good if and only if it contains only positive elements or if it contains both
positive and negative elements and it is possible to associate each negative element x
with a different positive element y in such a way that: (1) either y 1 x∗ with strict
preference for at least one pair, or (2) y ∼1 x∗ for every pair and the number of positive
elements in the set is greater than the number of negative elements. Conditions for
sets to be bad or indifferent are analogous.8
According to the second main result in Fishburn (1992, Theorem 2), some addi-
tional comparisons between non empty sets can be established by imposing a new
condition, which also involves compensations of values within each set and between
the two sets under comparison.9
Given that both GNB andWGNB rules are additive, one might think that it is possi-
ble to induce an underlying self reflecting signed order in both cases forwhich Fishburn
(1992) results are fulfilled. This is true for GNB rules but not for the general family of
WGNB rules. In particular, f can be specified by f (x) > 0 when {x}  ∅, f (x) = 0
when {x} ∼ ∅, f (x) < 0 when ∅  {x} and f (x) = − f (y) when ({x}  ∅ and
∅  {y}), which in turn corresponds to a fully specified self-reflecting signed order
where g ∼1 b∗ 1 n ∼1 n∗ 1 b ∼1 g∗. Here g, n and b are any elements of X such
that {g}  ∅, {n} ∼ ∅ and ∅  {b}. Starting from such a self-reflecting signed order,
and by identifying c with f , a GNB is the rule that satisfies all the specifications and
results of what Fishburn (1992) calls “Model 2”.
However, the WGNB class of rules does not enable self-reflecting signed-orders
to be completely induced because the relative values of α and β are unspecified. In
particular, merely knowing that a rule is in the WGNB class does not enable g to be
compared with b∗ or b with g∗ by means of 1, hence it is not possible to perform the
extension analysis proposed in Fishburn (1992).
In sum, Fishburn (1992) model and ours share an interest in additive rankings of
subsets that might contain good, neutral and bad elements. However there are key
methodological and interpretative differences between the two approaches.
First of all, Fishburn (1992) model is developed on the basis of two important
assumptions: the existence of a primitive self-reflecting signed order over X ∪ X∗, and
the proposal of an additive rule as a natural way to compare sets on the basis of a certain
numerical function defined on X . This is merely further evidence of the plausibility
8 Since preserving functions f are not unique, the previous result does not provide a complete classification
between good, indifferent and bad sets.
9 This condition is less immediate than the one used in Theorem 1, but shares the same tallying nature.
We believe that a detailed description of it goes beyond the scope of a generic comparison between the two
models.
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of additive rules, which justifies the interest of researching the axiomatic conditions
needed for them to arise. Our work follows this axiomatic approach in the case of
a specific subfamily of such additive rules. Moreover, the axiomatic characterization
that we develop is not made as an “extension” analysis because there is no primitive
relation defined over the single elements the information of which can be extended.
Our primitive materials are certain conditions that the relation among sets, , should
satisfy.
Moreover, the reason why we characterize a particular subfamily of additive rules
where only certain values of c are feasible is that our model aims to be applicable to
decision problems where simple categorization makes sense. This is clearly captured
by our axioms and constitutes a central concern for us. Fishburn (1992) purpose is not
to present a model of categorization: although his model certainly features a classifica-
tion into good, indifferent and bad elements, there is room for as much discrimination
between degrees of goodness or badness as may be desired.
Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License
which permits any use, distribution and reproduction in any medium, provided the original author(s) and
source are credited.
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